FIRST DIVISION
MARY GRACE M. VENERACION, G.R. No. 158238
representing herself and minors
DAISY M. VENERACION and Present
RICHARD M. VENERACION,
Petitioners, PANGANIBAN, C.J., Chairperson,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and
CHARLIE MANCILLA represented CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
by his heirs, namely, GIAR CHENG
LINDA T. MANCILLA, CAITLIN
MANCILLA, ERICA TIFFANY
MANCILLA, HON. JUDGE
ADORACION G. ANGELES, in her
capacity as Presiding Judge of the Promulgated:
Regional Trial Court, Branch
121,
SALAYON; and THE REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF
Respondents.
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CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before
the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of the Resolution[1] of
the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 74005, dismissing the petition for
partial annulment of judgment filed by petitioner Mary Grace M. Veneracion under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.
The Antecedents
On
Veneracion, secured a P1,200,000.00 loan from Charlie Mancilla.
She executed a promissory note on said date in which she bound and obliged herself to pay the
said amount on or before
Due to
In
the meantime, Charlie Mancilla died and was survived
by his heirs, Giar Cheng Linda, Caitlin, and Erica
Tiffany, all surnamed Mancilla. In due course, they
were impleaded as parties-plaintiffs in substitution
of Charlie Mancilla.
During
the pre-trial on
1. Both parties admit their capacity to
sue and be sued.
2. Both parties admit that the defendant borrowed money
from the plaintiff in the amount of P1,200,000.00.
3. Both parties admit that the defendant has executed on
4. That the obligation is secured by a Real Estate
Mortgage designated as TCT No. 87140 of the Registry of Deeds of Parañaque, Metro Manila (now a city).
5. Both parties admit that the defendant has paid an
advance interest of P60,000.00 on the date of
the execution of the promissory note on
6. Both parties admit that demand both orally and written
were made by plaintiff upon the defendant to settle the obligation, the last of
which was executed on
When
she testified, P1,200,000.00 loan from
the Banco Filipino
Savings Mortgage Bank which she intended to use to pay Mancilla. She later asked for the reduction of the monthly
interest from 5% per
month to 3%.
On
WHEREFORE,
premises considered and by preponderance of evidence, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of plaintiffs Giar Cheng Linda T. Ang-Mancilla, Caitlin Mancilla
and Erica Tiffany Mancilla and against defendant
Elizabeth Mendinueta who is accordingly ordered to
pay (1) the loan of P1,200,000.00, (2) interest equivalent to 5% per
month commencing March 14, 1995 until the principal obligation is paid, (3)
interests on accrued interest at the rate of 5% per month, within a period of
ninety (90) days from the entry of judgment and that in default of such payment
the property shall be sold at public auction to satisfy the judgment.
The
defendant is also ordered to pay attorney’s fees in the amount of 10% of the
whole amount due and demandable as well as the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.[6]
After
the records were remanded to the trial court, plaintiff moved for the issuance
of a writ of execution. The trial court
granted the motion on
During the public bidding, the Heirs
of Charlie Mancilla were the winning bidders, and the
Sheriff thereafter executed a Certificate of Sale on
On
It turned out that
1982
On
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that judgment be rendered:
1. Partially annulling the dispositive
portion of the Decision of the Honorable Public Respondent dated
the execution of the subject family home, more particularly the 19 October 2000
Order (granting the motion for issuance of writ of execution), the 7 November
2000 Writ of Execution, the 17 November 2000 Notice of Levy on Execution issued
by Public respondent Sheriff Salayon, the 24 November
2000 Sheriff’s Notice of Auction Sale on Execution, the 11 December 2000
Certificate of Posting of Public Respondent Salayon,
and the 20 December 2000 Minutes of Auction Sale issued by Public Respondent
Sheriff Salayon.
2. Ordering respondents to pay petitioners in solidum the amount of TWO HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (P200,000.00) as and by way of moral damages;
3. Ordering respondents to pay petitioners in solidum the
amount of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P200,000.00)
as and by way of attorney’s fees;
4. Ordering respondents to pay the costs of suit
and expenses of litigation; and
5. In the meantime and in the interest of justice,
let a Temporary Restraining Order and, after notice and hearing, a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, be issued enjoining the Register of Deeds of Parañaque City and the private respondents from canceling
TCT No. 87140 and transferring said title in the name of private respondents
and further restraining private respondents from making any acts of
dispossession of petitioners in regard to the subject property until the issues
raised in the instant petition had been definitely resolved.
Other
reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for.[14]
However,
petitioners failed to append to their petition the duplicate original/certified
true copy of the complaint filed with the RTC in Civil Case No. C-425, the motion for execution filed by the respondent in the same
court and the entry of judgment in G.R. No. 139944. Petitioners likewise failed to incorporate in
their petition any explanation why service of the petition on respondents was
not done personally, and to submit an affidavit of service of said petition on the
respondents on
1.
PETITIONERS
COMPLIED WITH THE PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS IN SECTION 4 OF RULE 47 OF THE RULES
OF COURT IN FILING THE INSTANT CIVIL ACTION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT;
2.
AS THE INSTANT
PETITION IS IN THE NATURE OF AN INITIATORY COMPLAINT WHERE THE HONORABLE
TRIBUNAL IS OBLIGATED TO SERVE SUMMONS TO RESPONDENTS UPON FINDINGS OF PRIMA
FACIE MERIT, THE REQUIREMENTS MENTIONED IN SECTION[S] 11 AND 13 OF RULE 13 (ON
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE AND WRITTEN EXPLANATION) DO NOT APPLY; AND
3.
AS THE DISMISSAL
OF THE INSTANT CIVIL CASE STANDS TO FATALLY DIM THE LIGHT ON WHAT APPEARS TO BE
THE ONLY REMEDY LEFT OF THE PETITIONERS AGAINST AN IRREPARABLE INJUSTICE OF
ILLEGALLY LOSING A FAMILY HOME, PETITIONERS BESEECH THE HONORABLE TRIBUNAL TO
LOOK BEYOND THE PROCEDURE WHICH THEY BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN SUBSTANTIALLY
COMPLIED WITH, AND ALLOW THE HONORABLE TRIBUNAL TO SEE THE MERITS OF THE
INSTANT CASE.[16]
Petitioners
appended to their motion a certified copy of the complaint in Civil Case No. C-425 and its appendages.[17] Petitioners
also filed a Manifestation on
On
The
appellate court likewise ruled that annulment of judgment may be based only on
the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. The action before the court a quo was for foreclosure of mortgage on
real property, which was within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the
RTC. Even supposing that the court a quo committed acts amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction such judgment cannot be the proper subject of an
action for annulment under Rule 47. If at all, the alleged lack or excess of
jurisdiction may be a ground for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Finally,
the appellate court declared that petitioners are seeking the annulment of the
court a quo’s judgment on the ground
that it committed a violation of substantive law in holding a family home
subject of execution even as its mortgage was made by their mother without their
father’s consent. Since it is not an
appeal, the correctness of the judgment is not in issue. Accordingly, there is
no need to address each error allegedly committed by the trial court.
Petitioners
forthwith filed a petition for review on certiorari
with this Court for the reversal of the CA Resolution.
Petitioners
aver that, under Section 4, Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, only
copies of decisions and final orders sought to be annulled are required to be
court certified. They had complied with
the Rules and appended to their petition a certified true copy of the decision
of the trial court’s decision in Civil Case No. C-425; they likewise
submitted to the CA the original and/or certified true copies of the trial
court’s Order granting the motion of the respondents for the issuance of a writ
of execution, the Writ of Execution, the Notice of Levy on Execution issued by
the Sheriff, the Sheriff’s Notice of Public Auction Sale along with the Minutes of the December
20, 2000 Public Auction Sale.
Petitioners contend that they could
not have availed of the remedy of an appeal or a certiorari petition under Rule 65, given that they were not parties
in the original action where the assailed decision was rendered. Petitioners point out that from the time the
action for foreclosure was filed in 1995 against the mother of petitioners up to the time the trial
court rendered the assailed judgment in 1997, they were all minors, and
therefore could not have validly participated in the court proceedings. Also, they came to know of the civil case and
the decision therein only on
Petitioners insist that the decision
of the trial court prejudiced their right to their family home and their
hereditary rights that accrued when their father died in 1999; thus, the filing
of a petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 was the proper remedy.
Petitioners further assert that the
CA erred when it failed to resolve the substantial grounds raised
in their petition, and instead opted to dismiss the case citing purported
procedural errors.
The issues for resolution are the
following: (1) whether the petition
before the CA complied with Section 4, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court; (2)
whether a petition for partial annulment of judgment/final order is the proper
remedy of petitioners; and (3) whether the petition before the CA states a
cause of action for partial annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of
Court.
We rule to deny the petition.
Section 4, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court
reads:
SEC. 4. Filing and contents of petition.—The
action shall be commenced by filing a verified petition alleging therein with
particularity the facts and the law relied upon for annulment, as well as those
supporting the petitioner’s good and substantial cause of action or defense, as
the case may be.
The
petition shall be filed in seven (7) clearly legible copies, together with
sufficient copies corresponding to the number of respondents. A certified true copy of the judgment or
final order or resolution shall be attached to the original copy of the
petition intended for the court and indicated as such by the petitioner.
The
petitioner shall also submit together with the petition affidavits of witnesses
or documents supporting the cause of action or defense and a sworn
certification that he has not theretofore commenced any other action involving
the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or different
divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if there is such other
action or proceeding, he must state the status of the same, and if he should
thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is
pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different divisions
thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to promptly inform the
aforesaid courts and other tribunal or agency thereof within five (5) days therefrom.
We agree with petitioners’ contention
that, under Section 4, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, they were required to
attach to the original copy of their petition a certified true copy of the
assailed decision, final order or resolution. Although petitioners are also
required to attach the affidavits of witnesses or documents supporting the
cause of action or defense, they are not required to submit certified copies of
such documents. Petitioners may just
submit plain copies thereof.
It must be stressed, however, that
petitioners are required to allege with particularity in their petition the
facts and the law relied upon for annulment as well as those supporting their
cause of action or defense, as the case may be.
Such requirement, as well as the requirement for petitioners to attach
to the original copy of their petition the affidavits of their witnesses and
documents supporting their cause of action or defense, are designed to convince
the appellate court of the substantive merit of their petition to avoid its outright
dismissal; or for the CA to make a finding of a prima facie merit in their petition and give due course thereto and
order the service of the petition and summons on the respondents.[19]
Unless petitioners append to their petition the appropriate documents, the
appellate court might dismiss the petition outright or deny due course to the
petition.
After all, an action to annul a final
judgment is an extraordinary remedy. Annulment of judgment is not a relief to
be granted indiscriminately by the Court. It is a recourse
equitable in character allowed only in
exceptional cases. The reason for the restriction is to prevent this extraordinary
action from being used by a losing party to make a complete farce of a duly
promulgated decision that has long become final and executory.[20] There would be no end to litigations if the parties
who have unsuccessfully availed of any of the appropriate remedies or lost them
through their fault could still bring an action for annulment of judgment.[21]
Moreover, if only plain copies of documents are appended to the original copy
of the petition, the CA may not give probative weight to such documents and opt
to dismiss the petition outright for lack of substantive or prima facie merit.
In this case, petitioners alleged in
their petition before the CA that their parents, who were then living together
as husband and wife, purchased the property on installment basis, and that their
father paid all the installments of the property because their mother had no
source of income. However, they failed
to append to their petition copies of the receipts for the installment payments
their father allegedly made. Their claim
that their mother had no source of income is belied by the trial court’s
finding that their mother was able to secure a loan from the Banco Filipino for P1,200,000.00,
which she intended to pay to Charlie Mancilla. It is quite incredible that P1,200.000.00 loan if she had no source of income, as claimed
by petitioners.
Petitioners averred in their petition
that the mortgaged property, their family home, was the conjugal property of their
parents, but that their father’s consent to the real estate mortgage was not
obtained by their mother as mortgagor.
By their claim, petitioners imply that, as beneficiaries and co-owners of
the family home, they were indispensable parties in Civil Case No. C-425;
consequently, the RTC had no jurisdiction over their persons, and as such, all
the proceedings before the RTC were null and void.[22] To
support this claim, petitioners should have appended to their petition parts of
the records of the RTC showing that the property is indeed their family home
and part of the conjugal property of their parents. This could have established the need for them
to be impleaded as parties-defendants. As the Court ruled in Arcelona v.
Court of Appeals:[23]
Admittedly, in this case, the want of jurisdiction of
the trial court in rendering its decision in Civil Case No. D-7240 is not
patent on the face of said judgment. However, there were glaring documentary
and testimonial pieces of evidence referred to by the trial court in its
decision which should have prompted it to inquire further whether there were
other indispensable parties who were not impleaded.
These facts and circumstances should have forewarned the trial court that it
had not acquired jurisdiction over a number of indispensable parties. In American jurisprudence, the nullity of a
decision arising from lack of jurisdiction may be determined from the record of
the case, not necessarily from the face of the judgment only. We believe that this rule should be applied
to this case, considering that in the assailed trial court’s decision,
referrals were made to crucial evidence which if scrutinized would readily
reveal that there were indispensable parties omitted.[24]
In this case, petitioners failed to append
to their petition copies, if any, of the pleadings in Civil Case No. C-425 in
which their mother had alleged that the mortgaged property was the family home and
conjugal in nature; and thus, exempt from forced sale under Article 155 of the
Family Code. However, the records of the
RTC do not contain such pleadings, as petitioners’ mother never alleged therein
that said property was conjugal and was the family
home.
Moreover, as gleaned from the
Resolution of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 57083 dated
In sum, Elizabeth Mendinueta
never alleged in the trial court, in the CA and in this Court that the property
is their family home and is conjugal in nature.
On its face, therefore, petitioners’ annulment
petition in the CA has no prima facie
or substantive merit.
Further, Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules
of Court provides that a judgment or final order or resolution in civil actions
of the RTC may be annuled only on grounds of extrinsic
fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction is the power and authority of the tribunal to hear, try and
decide a case. Jurisdiction does not
depend upon the regularity of the exercise by the Court of that power or on the
correctness of its decision.[26] Lack of jurisdiction refers to either lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or over the subject matter
of the action. Lack of jurisdiction or absence
of jurisdiction presupposes that the court should not have taken
cognizance of the complaint because the law or the Constitution does not vest
it with jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant or respondent is acquired by voluntary appearance or submission by
the defendant/respondent to the court, or by coercive process issued by the
court to such party through service of summons.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the claim is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations of the
complaint and the relief prayed for.[27] Whether the plaintiff is entitled to recovery
upon all or some of the claims prayed therein is not essential. Jurisdiction
over the subject matter is conferred by the Constitution or by law and not by
agreement or consent of the parties.[28] Neither does it depend upon the defenses of
the defendant in his/her answer or in a motion to dismiss.
Where the petition is grounded on lack
of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant/respondent or over the nature
or subject matter of the action, petitioners need not allege in the petition
that the ordinary remedy of new trial or reconsideration of the decision or
final order or resolution is no longer available through no
fault of his own. This is so because a
judgment rendered or a final order or resolution issued by the RTC without
jurisdiction is null and void and may be assailed at any time either
collaterally or in a direct action or by resisting such judgment or final order
or proceeding whenever it is invoked unless barred by laches.[29] A judgment rendered without jurisdiction over
the subject matter is void. If a
judgment is not void on its face, or from the recitals contained in the
decision, is regular in form, the aggrieved party may file a direct action to
annul the judgment and enjoin its enforcement. If the property subject of the
judgment has already been disposed of, he may institute a suit to recover the
property and collaterally attack the judgment.
Whether the challenged decision is void on its face or if the nullity of
the judgment is apparent by virtue of its own recital, the judgment may still be
attacked by direct action such as certiorari
or by a collateral attack. A judgment
which is void on its face and which requires only an inspection of the judgment
roll to demonstrate its want of vitality is a dead limb upon the judicial tree
which should be lopped off.[30]
Extrinsic fraud refers to any
fraudulent act of the prevailing party in the litigation which is committed
outside of the trial of the case whereby the unsuccessful party has been prevented
from exhibiting fully his case by fraud or deception
practiced on him
by his opponent. The overriding
consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is
that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from
having his day in court.[31]
In the present recourse, the assailed
decision, on its face, is valid. The RTC
had jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Petitioners do not also assail the
jurisdiction of the RTC over the action of the private respondents for the
judicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage executed by their mother,
Elizabeth Mendinueta, in favor of Charlie Mancilla. Petitioners
merely alleged that the RTC erred in ordering the sale of the property
mortgaged to Mancilla, on their claim that it is the
conjugal property of their parents and constitutes their family home.
Assuming, for the nonce, that
petitioners’ claims are correct, despite which the trial court rendered
judgment in favor of the respondents and ordered the sale thereof at public
auction, this error is but an error in the exercise of its jurisdiction. It is merely an error of judgment which does
not affect its authority to decide the case.[32] Thus
the remedy of the defendant therein was to appeal the decision to the CA,[33] which,
although resorted to, resulted in dismissal for failure to file brief as appellant.
Except for her plea that the accrued interest that she was ordered to pay under
the trial court’s decision was inequitable, Elizabeth Mendinueta
impliedly admitted the correctness of the appealed decision.
IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is
DENIED. Costs
against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
CONSUELO
YNARES-
Associate Justice Associate Justice
Associate Justice
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz, with Associate Justices Salvador J. Valdez, Jr. (Retired), and Mario L. Guariña III concurring; rollo, p. 73.
[2] CA rollo, pp. 56-58.
[3]
[4] Rollo, pp. 160-173.
[5] CA rollo, pp. 37-38.
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19] Section 5, Rule 47, Rules of Court; REGALADO, REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM, VOL. I, 6th ed., 560.
[20]
[21] Cerezo v. Tuazon,
G.R. No. 141538, November 23, 2004, 426 SCRA 164; Orbeta v. Sendiong, G.R. No. 155236, July 8,
2005, 463 SCRA 180.
[22] Arcelona v. Court of Appeals, 345
Phil. 250 (1997).
[23] Supra.
[24]
[25] CA rollo, pp. 135-137.
[26] Platinum
[27] Tolentino v. Leviste, G.R.
No. 156118,
[28] Arnado v. Buban,
A.M. No. MTJ-04-1543,
[29] Ancheta v. Ancheta,
G.R. No. 145370,
[30] Arcelona v. Court of Appeals, supra note 22, at
263.
[31] Tolentino v. Leviste, supra
note 27, at 282.
[32] Platinum
[33] Agbaba v. Inter-Urban Developers,
Inc., 438 Phil. 168, 189 (2002).